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Abstract.  The idea of 'subsidiarity' has been gaining influence within the
European Community.  'Subsidiarity' is based on a view of society in which
responsibilities are conditioned by the closeness of people's relationships. 
Intervention at higher levels of society has to be seen as subsidiary to the
obligations of smaller social units.  Applied more narrowly in the context of the
Community, subsidiarity has been taken to refer to a functional division of
administrative responsibilities, although at times the principle is referred back to
its wider usage; it implies an emphasis on decentralisation and diversity.
The gradual expansion of European interventions in national social policies has
depended on a strategy of developing precedents and competence.  The idea of
subsidiarity, used virtually as a synonym for national sovereignty, has been
enlisted to oppose this trend.  Although the principle does limit the scope of a
supra-national organisation, there is still scope for a European social policy
which establishes principles and develops other kinds of solidarity.  If, moreover,
the issue is genuinely one of subsidiarity, it implies not only that the European
Commission must limit and devolve its powers, but that wherever possible
national governments should do the same.
Résumé.  Le principe de subsidiarité devient de plus en plus important dans la
politique de la Communauté Européene.  Ce principe est basé sur un concept
de la société d'après lequel la solidarité est déterminée par la proximité des
relations sociales.  Les actions des institutions des échelons supérieurs de la
société doivent etre vues comme subsidiares à celles des unités inférieures. 
Appliquée au contexte restreint de la Communauté, la subsidiarité se
comprends plutot selon une division fonctionelle du travail administratif; mais le
principe se rattache toujours à l'usage conventionnel, qui veut dire également la
décentralisation et la diversité.
L'interposition graduelle de la Communauté dans la politique sociale des
états-membres dépend d'une stratégie qui entraine la constitution de precédents
et de compétences.  UtilisLe en fait comme synonyme à la souverainté
nationale, la subsidiarité s'engage contre cette stratégie; elle limite le pouvoir
d'une organisation supra-nationale.  Néanmoins, il reste la possibilité d'une
politique sociale européene pour établir des principes généraux et des
solidarités nouvelles.  De plus, le respect pour la subsidiarité suggère non
seulement que la Commission doit se limiter en faveur de la décentralisation,
mais aussi que les pouvoirs nationaux doivent en faire autant.
The idea of 'subsidiarity' has been growing in influence within the European
Community.  The principle refers "to the need to ensure that political decisions
are not taken at any higher level than they need to be" (Millan, 1990), or, more
precisely, that there should be "a decentralised organisation of responsibilities,
with the aim of never entrusting to a larger unit what can better be realised by a
smaller one" (Delors, 1989).   The Commission, describing the principle as
'commonsense', has suggested that the Treaty of Rome should be amended to
incorporate it (European Commission, 1990a).
Subsidiarity is not a new concept.  The term is used in debates in different
European countries (Vranken, 1984, refers to it in Belgium; Roebroek, 1989, in
the Netherlands), mainly by the Christian parties of the right.  The development
of the principle in Europe is generally attributable to the influence of the Catholic
Church, and it has usually been put forward by the political parties most
influenced by Catholicism.  It can be traced back at least to the nineteenth
century (Hofmeister, 1982, p.280), though its formulation is more usually
credited to the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (Pius XI, 1931).  The encyclical
argues:
"just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and to commit to the
community at large what private enterprise and endeavour can
accomplish, so it is likewise unjust and a gravely harmful disturbance of
right order to turn over to a greater society of higher rank functions and
services which can be performed by lesser bodies on a lower plane.  For
a social undertaking of any sort, by its very nature, ought to aid the
members of the body social, but never to destroy and absorb them."
(Pius XI, 1931, p. 203)
The effect of such a principle is partly to treat state intervention as undesirable,
at least to the extent that available alternatives are to be preferred, and partly to
justify a degree of institutional decentralisation.  The justifications for subsidiarity
can be seen in terms of a defence of the liberty of the individual and the
preservation of personal independence.  There is nothing about this formulation
which is distinctively Catholic: Roebroek refers to a Protestant principle of
'sovereignty in one's own circle' (1989, p. 148), which fulfils a very similar
purpose.  But the principle of subsidiarity has dimensions which go well beyond
individualism.  
The 'organic' view of society favoured in some forms of conservatism presents a
view of society as a complex series of networks, social interactions,
relationships and obligations.  Clarke writes:
"Man is born into society, into a family and a nation, and, by the mere fact
of existence, assumes inescapable duties towards his fellows and is
endowed with the rights of membership of that society."  (1975, p.166)
People are not, by this account, simply 'individuals'; their lives are shaped by the
circumstances in which they live, and they are members of a complex,
differentiated society.  Within this model, subsidiarity is justified as an
expression of the responsibilities that people have for each other's welfare. 
These depend on the the closeness of their relationship.  Because the closest
relationships mainly exist within families, it is the family which bears the primary
responsibility for social support.  The role of others who are more remote is
correspondingly reduced; they are 'subsidiary' to the primary responsibilities. 
The role of public services, in particular, is subsidiary to that of family, the local
community and the private sector.  
The application of the idea of 'subsidiarity' to the provision of welfare may seem,
from the perspective of the United Kingdom, to be very close to a 'residual'
concept.  Residual welfare represents welfare as a safety net, made available to
people only when they are unable to meet their needs from their own or their
family's resources (Titmuss, 1974).  The connection between the two is also in
part political - both residual welfare and subsidiarity imply a limited scope for
state intervention, and favour the private market.  But there are important
distinctions between them.  In the first place, the idea of subsidiarity has
implications which go beyond the provision of welfare in itself.  In the European
Community, it has been applied to a wide range of issues, including monetary
policy, taxation, consumer protection, cultural activities and even the fisheries
policy.  It could be argued, of course, that the residual model of welfare itself is
concerned with issues which are wider than those of welfare alone - issues like
freedom, independence, and the market economy.  But subsidiarity is explicitly
addressed to a range of spheres of action, including political, social and
economic activities, of which welfare is only a part.  
Despite their similarity in tone, the principle of subsidiarity is stated much more
subtly than the model of residual welfare.  Welfare provision which is not
designed as a 'safety net' is not generally thought of as 'residual': public water
supplies, libraries, or a National Health Service would all fall outside the remit of
a residual model.  But the way in which 'subsidiarity' is described does not say
that such measures are irreconcilable with the principle.  The basis on which the
idea is described within the encyclical suggests that the provision of welfare is
legitimate in principle: a social organisation ought to aid the members of the
body social.  The presumption is that smaller agencies are to be preferred, but
agencies which are larger, more general, or more universal may be justified in
circumstances where they provide a positive benefit which cannot be obtained
through other means.  Subsidiarity implies, not that services will be confined to
one tier, or that services must be provided by non-state agencies, but that there
will be a range of services, set at different levels according to their functions and
purposes.  Whether or not welfare should be provided by the state depends, in
part, on whether private enterprise and endeavour can achieve the desired
effects; the assumption here is that private provision is more direct than pubic. 
The appropriate basis for provision is the least remote alternative which works.
This implies, in turn, that the pattern of provision which is likely to emerge from
the application of a principle of subsidiarity will look very different from one
which relies on residual welfare alone.  Subsidiarity is structured not only to
prefer the individual over the community, but also to favour local policy over
national policy.  This principle owes a great deal to continental liberalism. 
Benjamin Constant argued that, just as there was an area of each person's life
which was private to that person, so any two people, a family, or group would
have areas which were private, and so which no other person could legitimately
intervene in.  This applied not only to small groups of people but
neighbourhoods, communities, regions and nations (1815).  The local dimension
found a place within the liberal tradition, but it is almost wholly absent from
considerations of the residual model of welfare - and in many ways it is more
commonly associated in Britain with left-wing views, concerned with
decentralisation as a means of empowerment (see Beresford and Croft, 1986).
The idea of subsidiarity depends, then, on a view of social networks quite
distinct from that implied by residual welfare.  The contrast between the two
models is most easily understood when the concepts are considered in contrast
to their opposites - respectively, solidarity and the model of institutional welfare. 
Residual welfare, which is welfare as a safety net for people in unusual
circumstances, is generally viewed in opposition to institutional welfare, which
bases welfare in an acceptance of need as a normal part of social life. 
Subsidiarity is presented in contrast to the principle of solidarity, in which people
accept mutual obligations and interdependence; there is a tension between the
two, in so far as an emphasis on solidarity emphasises the need for collective
provision, and subsidiarity restricts its scope.  But subsidiarity is not opposed to
solidarity in the way that residual welfare is opposed to institutional welfare.  On
the contrary, it defines the patterns through which solidarity is expressed, and
the Catholic Church has explicitly argued for both principles (Coote, 1989). 
Subsidiarity means that solidarities are hierarchically ordered; the main source
of solidarity, or mutual responsibility, is the family, secondarily a community, and
so forth; only at a distance are there responsibilities to the state, the
international community or 'humanity'.  The picture that emerges is of
progressively widening circles of responsibility, which diminish in strength with
social distance.  The kinds of action which are taken to care for others depend
on the strength of the responsibility attributed to different kinds of social group at
different levels.  
The appeal of this model is that (unlike individualism) it has a powerful
sociological basis.  Whether relationships and obligations are seen in terms of
social norms, roles or exchange, there is a body of theory which identifies
obligations as structured at a range of levels, with a different level of obligation
applying to people at different degrees of social remoteness.  (It might even be
argued, to adapt a suggestion made by Sahlins (1972), that the level of
closeness between people can be defined in terms of the kinds of obligation
they feel towards each other.)  Subsidiarity has, then, a strong moral foundation,
in the sense of the recognition of dominant social norms, as well as a
considerable practical force - the ways that people relate to each other are
structured, and state interventions work within this kind of social framework.  A
good example is community care policy, where the myth of comprehensive state
intervention has been challenged from both left and right.  In practice, much of
the care given to people with high levels of personal need - such as physical
dependency - is given by partners and families, often by the women in families. 
Bayley, describing in a classic work the pattern of care available for mentally
handicapped people (1973), demonstrated that the effect of state provision was
at best marginal in relation to the bulk of the care that was being given - implying
that the state had to recognise the existing framework in order to make its own
contribution to the greatest effect.
If the idea of subsidiarity has attractions for conservatives, it is not least that it
rather better expresses traditional conservative concerns than the model of
residual welfare, which owes more to liberalism; and, appropriately, it places
residual welfare within a broad ideological framework.  It is possible to see these
principles being adopted in relation to the British Conservative government's
policies on issues like community care, family policy, and the voluntary sector -
though not, one has to note, in relation to local government, where their policies
have been aggressively centralist.
Conversely, those who do not share a conservative perspective may find the
principle unattractive.  Despite the power of the model, in both a descriptive and
a moral sense, there are important reservations to be made.  The descriptive
power of the model does not necessarily establish a firm moral basis for its
acceptance: the way things are is not necessarily the way that they should be.  It
may be true that families carry a substantial part of the burden of care, but that
does not mean that the family is necessarily the best or even the most desirable
option.  The burdens of care imposed through social networks are not simply to
be accepted; they can dominate and even destroy people's well-being.  Equally,
the location of certain responsibilities within specific localities can create major
problems of equity - because the areas of greatest need, and the most deprived
communities, are also those with the least resources to meet those
responsibilities.  Although the principle of subsidiarity is supported by many
social norms, it has to be qualified by other principles, including human rights,
freedom, justice and welfare.
Subsidiarity and the European Community
The application of the concept of 'subsidiarity' within the European Community is
highly ambiguous.  Community documents generally refer to the issue of
subsidiarity as a principle which governs the distribution of responsibilities
between the institutions of the Community and the Member States.  The draft
Treaty of European Union refers to the principle in terms of an appropriate
allocation of responsibilities; community institutions should have "only those
powers required to complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more
satisfactorily than the States acting independently."  (European Parliament,
1984, p.9)  The Single European Act (Council, 1987) is supposed to make
'express reference' to subsidiarity, though it takes a considerable effort of the
imagination to see how; the principle apparently can be found in Article 130r,
which is concerned with the Community's powers in relation to the environment
FGiscard d'Estaing, 1990a).  The connection between the article and the
principle is far from obvious; the explanation given by Nicoll, a Director-General
of the Council, (1990) is that the article, which establishes that the community
should take on a role where it can do so more effectively than the states, has
been understood in the Parliament as translating the principle of subsidiarity into
practice.  The Parliament has since accepted the following 'definition' of the
concept:
"The Community shall only act to fulfil the tasks transferred to it by treaty
and to achieve the objectives defined thereby.  If powers have not been
exclusively or completely assigned to the Community, the Community
shall, in carrying out its tasks, take action in so far as the achievement of
these objectives requires its intervention because, by virtue of their
magnitude or effects, they transcend the frontiers of the Member States
or because they can be undertaken more efficiently by the Community
than by the Member States acting separately."  (Giscard-d'Estaing,
1990b).
This is an application rather than a definition, and on the face of it, it is not
particularly consistent with the initial idea; if all that 'subsidiarity' means is that
institutions should act within their powers and that different functions should be
placed where they are most efficiently exercised, it is far from clear that it
favours decntralisation. 
The frame of reference within which the principle is being applied here is
evidently much more restricted than in the Catholic concept.  The idea of
subsidiarity has been narrowed to a principle which governs institutional
structures.  But this does not mean that it will not be understood in other ways,
both because it is still being used in the Catholic sense elsewhere in Europe,
and because the central arguments for the principle relate to a view of society
which stretches beyond a view of the role of political institutions.  The same
committee which proposed the Parliament's resolution also argued for a
distinction between 'vertical' subsidiarity (distinguishing the powers of the
Community and the Member states) and 'horizontal' subsidiarity ("under which a
distinction is made between the powers of the public authorities and those of
society") (Giscard-d'Estaing, 1990a, p.2); Delors refers to the principle as
involving respect for pluralism and diversity (1989, p.23).  This seems to
recognise the wider use of the term.  Used ideas, like second-hand shoes, tend
to have been worn in for the comfort of the previous occupants.  
One of the reasons why the use of the term within the EC has been so confusing
is that much of this background is taken for granted.  The principle is being
taken to mean more than the official definitions imply, and acceptance of the
principle of 'subsidiarity' is being taken to limit the scope for activity by the
community in a range of areas.  An earlier resolution of the European Parliament
notes that, when the principle of subsidiarity is applied, 
"far-reaching competencies will remain with the Member States in the
fields of economics, taxation, education, culture, social security, health,
family policy, the organisation of local government, public transport,
infrastructure, police, penal code, private law, religion and many other
areas" (European Parliament, 1990).
It seems clear, then, that important elements of the concept are being taken as
implicit.  From the perspective of social policy, the application of the principle of
'subsidiarity' in a European context seems irresistibly to imply not only that
welfare provision overall will be limited, but that the role of the Community must
of necessity be minor in relation to that of other providers of welfare.  
The social policy of the European Community 
The primary justification for the intervention of the EC in social policy has little to
do with social policy in its own right.  The European Commission's interventions
in economic markets are justified in terms of a 'level playing ground' - an attempt
to establish uniformity of basic conditions.  The primary economic justification for
this lies in the theory of comparative advantage; in the conditions of ordinary
market exchange, the specialisation of parties in those areas which they can
produce most effectively maximises the productive capacity, and so the
economic welfare, of both.  Distortions in the market have the effect of reducing
the scope for appropriate specialisation, implying sub-optimal patterns of
exchange.    
Although this argument has some implications for social policy, its direct
relevance is limited.  The EC's first efforts to involve itself in social policy were
limited by its concern with the economics of the labour market.  Swann identifies
four main strands in the policy.  First was the expansion of the total resources of
the community.  Second was labour mobility.  Third, there was the
harmonization of social security payments, and related issues affecting workers
in different countries.  Fourth, and last, was the Social Fund, which despite its
name was also mainly concerned with the labour market - particularly with
redeployment, or the resettling of people who were unemployed as a result of
the development of industrial specialisations within the community (Swann,
1975 pp 184-193).  
The view of the EC as an organisation mainly for trade offers little support to the
development of social policy in its widest sense.  To the extent that individual
workers may be influenced by the package of benefits available in different
countries, it may be true that unequal benefits may distort the labour market. 
Labour mobility is affected by a range of factors, including, for example,
occupational training, language education and housing.  The costs of welfare
provision, equally, affect the conditions in which firms operate, both through
general taxation and more specifically through payroll taxes.  But it is no less
true that the labour market is likely to be affected by other factors - including
salaries, relative living costs, prospects, the availability of employment, and
other living conditions.  The idea that social benefits in themselves are
particularly likely to be of influence is questionable; an emphasis on equality in
relation to social benefits, when there might not be equality in these other
aspects, is no less suspect.  It would be difficult, then, to justify any very
substantial intervention by the EC in social issues on this basis.
During the 1970s, however, the emphasis of Community social policy changed
towards improving 'living and working conditions' in the community, and the idea
of the 'worker' was extended to include those who were not part of the labour
force.  Once it was accepted that the Community had social objectives distinct
from the the economic objectives, it became possible to expand the role of the
Community in social policy; in particular, Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome
allows for the extension of the Commission's power to achieve the Community's
objectives.  Although there has been considerable resistance to the
Commission's expansion into this area, the Council of Ministers accepted in
principle in 1984 that the Community should be concerned with social
protection, population policy and policy for the family - usually understood to
refer to families with children.  These issues are included (in very broad terms)
in the Social Charter.  
Despite the attention given to the Social Charter, the proposals contained little
which was new - which makes its watering down all the more depressing.  The
concern of the UK government to remove reference to non-workers from the
Social Charter in many ways missed the point, because the Charter would have
been applied to non-workers in any case.  But most of the provisions which have
survived are tied, directly or indirectly, to the labour market.  Unemployment
benefit, vocational training, sex discrimination, or the extension of the rights of
part-time workers, are areas in which the EC has already gained substantial
influence, partly through the application of EC law, and partly because the
decisions which the EC makes about rules of employment, trade or taxation
inevitably affect national social policies.  
This is symptomatic of a general limitation on the ability of the Commission to
develop social policies on a European basis.  The direct powers of the EC to
provide welfare services are still very restricted.  Unable to institute major
policies in its own right, the Commission has flirted with special 'programmes',
like the poverty programme or, more recently, projects relating to disability and
elderly people.  Regional policy has been used to fund certain kinds of welfare
projects, but it is bound to particular areas and generally requires national
government co-operation.  The use of these policies is evidence of a desire to
intervene in welfare policy, but it is more than that.  The Commission's strategy
seems to be based, not least, on the example of the development of welfare
provision within the United States.  The US federal government, unable in many
cases to intervene directly in respect of basic welfare provisions, has tended to
build up special programmes (like the 'War on Poverty'); to invite states to
participate in federal programmes (like Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
and the less successful AFDC-U for unemployed people with families); to
develop the rights of individuals as a sanction against state governments; and to
limit the scope of states to vary from certain federal standards.  In many
respects, the approach adopted by the Commission reflects the US approach
fairly directly.  In justifying the directive for a health warning on cigarette
packets, for example, the Commission established the position that it was the
Community, and not the member countries, which is responsible for regulatory
policy as soon as state lines are crossed.  That is precisely the justification
which was used by the federal government of the United States for federal laws
which would affect the conduct of the states - like the US minimum wage, which
applies to all firms engaged in inter-state commerce - and it has been central to
the development of US welfare policy.  
This does not fully encapsulate the kinds of measure which have been taken,
though, because the Commission has been expanding its influence in other
ways.  Probably the most significant strategy which it has adopted has
depended on the incremental development of marginal, relatively innocuous
measures in order to establish precedent and competence.  The measures in
relation to cigarette packets again provide an example.  It makes the point not
only that the Community is concerned with trade, but also that it has the power
to intervene in matters related to public health.  This is part of a general
approach, which has extended to policies for pharmaceuticals, organ
transplants, formula baby milk, or water regulation.  The Commission has also
argued for controls on aluminium to protect dialysis patients travelling between
countries, a point which seems to stretch the arguments for intervention
gossamer thin; if it is important, it is because it would establish a further
precedent in respect of public health.  
Further examples of the attempt to develop the power to intervene have
included bus passes and language education in schools.  The idea that
pensioners should be able to take advantage of concessions abroad, like bus
passes, is very limited in its scope, but it meant more than it appeared to be.  It
implied not only that rules which are meant to apply to 'workers' have to be
applied to people who are not workers - which is by now well established - but
also that the Commission would have a direct interest in the welfare of elderly
people, which is why the proposal was savaged, becoming only a
recommendation to member states.  The Commission's desire to extend its
competence in relation to elderly people is evident; a new programme for elderly
people has been announced, and 1993 is to be the 'European Year of the
Elderly and Solidarity between Generations'.  If the Community has the right to
intervene in relation to benefits and services for elderly people which are not
related to the labour market, it would bring a substantial tranche of the
provisions made by European welfare states within the Community's remit.  
The process of taking a crowbar to welfare provisions was made more explicit in
relation to the Lingua programme than any other.  This was intended to give the
EC the right to intervene in the provision of education in the member countries;
and that is what the Commission considers it achieved.  Vasso Papandreou, the
redoubtable Commissioner for Social Affairs, said it quite plainly:  'we now have
competence in school education' (Usborne, 1989).  Education is being treated
as part of the 'social benefits' available in the 'people's Europe'.
The potential for the expansion of Community activity seems considerable.  A
justification for intervention has been established in relation to public health,
social protection, education and family policy; action for vulnerable groups
includes measures for young people and women (Venturini, 1989); Social
Europe has referred to the intention to expand the Community's activities in
relation to poverty, disability and old age (Social Europe, 1989), and more
recently to ethnic minorities and 'marginals' (1990, p.35).  This lays the
foundations for a new kind of social policy, in which the locus of control is moved
away from national governments.  
Subsidiarity and European social policy
The central defence of national governments against communitarian inroads into
their field of activity has been couched in terms partly of 'sovereignty', and partly
of subsidiarity.  Sovereignty emphasises the control of national governments
over their own sphere of influence.  But the idea of sovereignty is a blunt
instrument, and those who wish to maintain their power and authority by
opposing the extension of bus passes can be made to feel foolish in referring to
it.  Much of the case for sovereignty has in any case been undermined by the
agreement to enter Europe; there is no obvious reason to take the arguments
very seriously.  
By contrast with 'sovereignty', the idea of 'subsidiarity' is rooted in a rich,
complex body of social theory with a strong moral foundation.  It is not difficult to
see why subsidiarity has been co-opted for the purposes of opposing the
expansion of Community responsibilities.  The idea is distinctively European - a
concept widely current and accepted within the political debates of a number of
member countries.  The emphasis on the power of the more local, lesser body
has a clear implication for the centralising force of the European Commission.  
The growing acceptance of the language of subsidiarity within the EC has been
shaped by the kind of strategy the Commission had been following to expand its
competence.  The problem with the sorts of issue which have been used as a
lever - like bus passes, cigarette packets and language education - is precisely
that they are apparently trivial.  As such, they are among the measures which
are most vulnerable to the objection that they violate a principle of subsidiarity. 
Bus passes and other concessions to pensioners might reasonably be left to
local authorities (as they are in the UK); it is the sort of issue which central
governments do not necessarily deal with.  The school curriculum may be
centralised, but it may not be; a principle of subsidiarity brings the issue down to
the level of local government or even to the school.  Only the issue of cigarette
packets, because it is being applied to trade across national boundaries, seems
to avoid the objections.  Even then, Leon Brittan has argued that a principle of
subsidiarity, strictly interpreted, would apply 
"even if the legislation being considered was clearly within the
competence of the Community.  Its purpose would not be to define the
Community's competence, but to limit the extent to which it should be
exercised." (Brittan, 1990)
Subsidiarity has, then, a major effect in limiting the scope for a European social
policy, as it must limit the actions of any supra-national body.  The effect of
accepting it could be to take issues like the provision of health care (which is
decentralised or regional in some countries), personal social services, education
and housing largely outside the possible remit of the European Community.  The
potential for the Social Charter was enormously limited by the development of
support for the concept.  Initially, the charter was presented in the following
terms:
"A solemn declaration, the Charter requires no amendments to the
Treaty; its aim is not to widen Community competence in the social field.
... The initiatives to be taken to implement these social rights are the
responsibility, depending of the case in question, of the Member States
and the bodies which constitute them or the responsibility of the
European Community in line with the principle of subsidiarity ... "
(European Commission, 1989b)
But the idea of subsidiarity was held to limit the terms of the Charter much more
extensively.  A background report on a relatively minor aspect of the
implementation of the Social Charter (part time work) describes the situation as
follows:
"While the Charter itself ... creates no binding legal rights or obligations, it
is now being complemented by specific individual proposals for
legislation. ... The Commission's overall strategy is set out in its Action
Programme ... [which] identifies more than 40 areas in which steps can
be taken to reinforce the social dimension.  ... In the vast majority of
cases the Commission confirms that any action required should be taken
by the individual member states, or should be tackled by means of
Commission opinions or recommendations which do not create legally
binding obligations on the member states.
   This reflects the Commission's new buzz word - "Subsidiarity", namely
that binding measures should only be taken at a Community level where
absolutely appropriate, leaving many areas of policy solely to the
discretion of the member states."  (European Commission, Nov 1990b,
p.1)
The way in which the case for subsidiarity has been argued, which this fairly
captures, prompts some scepticism about its persuasiveness.  Subsidiarity is
being taken here, as it is in the Parliament's discussions (Giscard-d'Estaing,
1990a/b), as a limitation which leaves decisions to the member states.  If this
were all that the principle of subsidiarity implied, it would be equivalent to
sovereignty, and it loses its moral force; one has to be suspicious of a moral
principle which seems to limit the actions of the EC and almost no-one else.  
The acceptance of intervention by the European Community in order to remove
obstacles to economic trade is an indication that other principles can temper the
principle of subsidiarity - in this case, principles derived from the economics of
international trade.  There is some inconsistency in arguing that the European
Community can intervene supra-nationally in economic affairs but could not
have a case to intervene supra-nationally in social affairs.  Social Europe
argues, I think rightly, that
"With the Single Market economic strategy embracing all of the
Community, the principle of 'subsidiarity' can no longer apply
automatically to social protection without rejecting the very principles of
the Treaty of Rome" (Social Europe, 1990, p.7).
Subsidiarity does not constitute a bar to intervention; it only establishes a
condition to be satisfied - that interventions must be justifiable at the level at
which they are implemented.  One can, then, accept the core of subsidiarity
while at the same time accepting that it is qualified by other principles.  
The extent to which subsidiarity is subject to other principles is taken into
account in the concept itself.  The model of society presupposed in the concept
of subsidiarity implies that patterns of solidarity are structured according to
existing social networks and communal identification.  Social policies can be
established only in so far as a solidaristic network is established.  Although there
may be universal values - universal in the sense that they cannot be claimed for
some without conceding, at the same time, that they apply to others who meet
the same basic conditions - they have to be interpreted in the context of specific
social relationships.  Peter Jones distinguishes universalism from a 'particularist'
view, in which political and social boundaries are held to have a moral
significance.  'Radical particularism' is based in the view that people are
members of particular societies, and their rights and obligations can be viewed
only in relation to those societies; 'moderate particularism' argues only that
different societies have some rules which are special to themselves (Jones,
1990).  The principle of subsidiarity implies a number of reservations about the
universal application of social and moral principles, reservations which are
consistent with different forms of particularism.  One is that many moral
obligations must be interpreted in the context of a particular society.  A second is
that moral obligations are structured, so that the nature of obligations changes
with proximity.  Neither of these propositions favours the development of
networks of responsibility at an international level.
This does not imply, however, that the European Community cannot intervene in
areas of welfare policy.  It may be possible for the EC to establish universal
principles which are then operationalised in the context of specific social
conditions.  This pattern is outlined in a proposal for  vocational training:
"The philosophy of 'subsidiarity' very much applies to the programme,
with Member States being called upon to implement a common
framework of principles for the development and improvement of training
policies and systems ... " (European Commission, 1989a).
The Community, by this account, establishes principles while the States work
out the practice.  Similarly, a recently proposed directive on transport for
workers with reduced mobility - another example of incremental pressure to
establish the Commission's competence - implies substantial regulation of public
transport systems, but leaves the details to member states.  The Commission
argues that the provisions
"take sufficient account of the principle of subsidiarity, which is of
particular importance in the field of public transport, which (except for
trains) is organized at local or regional level in almost all the Member
State.  Consequently, the Directive sets the aim to be achieved and
leaves each competent authoity to choose how best to implement the
Directive according to the real needs of these users."  (European
Commission, 1991, p.2)
At the same time, it may  also be possible for the Community to exercise a
number of specific functions.  In general, functions like the provision of welfare
should be decentralised to the level at which they are most appropriately
exercised.  The idea of Europe as a community, or a system of cross-national
communities, identifies both the limits and the potential for a European social
policy.  There are divisions at local, regional and national levels.  But the
development of cross-national solidarities within the community implies that both
that there will be a increasing degree of interdependence, and that particularist
principles will be confined, not to national boundaries, but to sectors within the
European Community.  
If this is the case, the case against European intervention at the social level
becomes very much weaker.  Where issues are of the kind which relate to the
moral identity of a community, that community is often smaller than that which is
identified with member states; where they relate to regions, nations, or
language, a principle of subsidiarity supports diversity and self-determination;
and where values are viewed as universal, the appropriate level seems to be
supra-national.  It may well be at the European level, rather than the level of the
nation-state, that many social interventions would have to be organised; even
where national governments have delegated responsibility for enforcement (as
they currently do within legal processes) an appeal to the European level must
be allowed for if any generally applicable principle is to be admitted and
enforced.  
The corollary of this argument is that the social policies of national governments
should be framed in terms which are consistent in principle with those being
developed on the basis of subsidiarity in Europe as a whole.  If the principle of
subsidiarity is admitted at a European level, it is difficult to see why it should
cease to apply at levels currently within the remit of national governments.  If the
issues being addressed relate to local communities, regions, or nations rather
than the territorial areas of member states, the exercise of powers and location
of functions properly belongs at those levels.  Subsidiarity implies not only that
the European Community should foster the devolution of power, but that
wherever possible national governments should do the same.  This must call
into question the idea that the doctrine of 'subsidiarity' can be used effectively in
defence of the sovereignty of the existing member states.  On the contrary, it
seems to undermine sovereignty both internally and externally.
Note
Thanks are due to Brian Smith, Brian Baxter, and Antony Black for comments;
and to David Hart in the European Documentation Centre at the University of
Dundee. 
References
M Bayley (1973) Mental handicap and community care, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
P Beresford and S Croft (1986), Whose welfare?, Brighton: Brighton
Polytechnic.
L Brittan (1990)  The new Europe: from spectator to participant - does the
European community interfere too much?, (speech, 11th October), IP/90/815.
D Clarke (1975), 'The Conservative faith in a modern age', in P Buck (ed), How
Conservatives think, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
B Constant (1815), Principes de politique, in Oeuvres, Paris: Editions Gallimard,
1957.
N Coote (1989).  "Catholic social teaching", Social Policy and Administration
23(2).
J Delors (1989).  Seance d'ouverture de la quarantieme annee academique du
College D'Europe, Bruges, 17th October; author's translation.
European Commission (1989a).  Eurotecnet II: Action programme in the field of
vocational training and technological change, COM(89)355.
European Commission (1989b).  Commission proposes a community charter for
fundamental social rights, P/89/55.
European Commission (1990a).  Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the
proposal for amendment of the treaty establishing the European Economic
Community with a view to political union, DOC/90/4.
Council of the European Communities (1987).  Single European Act and Final
Act, Brussels.
European Commission (1990b)  Background report: stronger rights for part-time
employees and new rules for working hours, ISEC/B27/1990.
European Commisssion (1991)  Background report: safe transport to work of
workers with reduced mobility, ISEC/B3/91.
European Parliament (1984)  Draft Treaty establishing the European Union,
Luxembourg: European Parliament.
European Parliament  (1990)  "Resolution on the principle of subsidiarity", 12th
July Official Journal C 231/163-165, 17th September.
V Giscard-d'Estaing (1990a)  Interim report drawn up on behalf of the
Committee on Institutional Affairs on the principle of subsidiarity, DOC
A3-163/90.
V Giscard-d'Estaing (1990b).  Report of the Committee of Institutional Affairs on
the principle of subsidiarity, A3-0267/90.
H Hofmeister (1982) "Austria", in P A Kohler, H F Zacher (eds) The evolution of
social insurance 1881-1981, London: Pinter.
P N Jones (1990) "Universal principles and particular claims" in R E Goodin, A
Ware (eds) Needs and welfare, London: Sage.
B Millan (1990),  Speech at Paisley College, 20th April.
W Nicoll (1990),  Speech at St Andrew's, 11th May.
Pius XI (1931),  Quadragesimo Anno, Actae Apostolicae Sedis 23.
J M Roebroek (1989),  "Netherlands", in J Dixon, R P Scheurell (eds) Social
welfare in developed market countries, Routledge 1989.
Social Europe (1989), The social aspects of the internal market, issue 7/89,
Brussels: European Commission.
Social Europe (1990)  The social aspects of the internal market vol 3,
Supplement 3/90, Brussels: European Commission.
M Sahlins (1972) Stone age economics, London: Tavistock.
D Swann (1975)  The economics of the common market, 3rd edition, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
R M Titmuss (1974)  Social policy: an introduction, London: Allen and Unwin.
D Usborne (1989)  "Britain loses battle to obstruct EC Lingua scheme in
schools", The Independent, 23rd May, p. 12.
P Venturini (1989)  1992: The European Social Dimension, Brussels:
Commission of the European Communities.
J Vranken (1984)  "Anti-poverty policy in Belgium", in J C Brown (ed)
Anti-poverty policy in the European Community, London: Policy Studies
Institute.
